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ARE WE PREPARED TO OFFER EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL? 
PAUL J. KELLY, JR.* 
I am told that this function or program comes about due to the concern and 
generosity of Mortimer Rosecan, who, I understand, was one of the premier 
trial lawyers of his day.  His reputation was one of always being prepared and, 
although I never met Mr. Rosecan, I am reasonably certain that we would share 
common concerns about the practice of law and for those about to embark 
upon that journey.  With a little bit of effort, practicing law can be one of the 
most rewarding careers a person could choose. 
That said, we are not an untroubled profession.  Each of us would do well 
to keep in mind the comments of Dean Roscoe Pound when he described the 
practice of law as “the pursuit of a learned art, a common calling in the spirit of 
public service, no less a public service because it is incidentally the means of a 
livelihood.” 
I am concerned, as I know Mr. Rosecan was, that perhaps we have 
reversed the order of Dean Pound’s definition, placing pursuit of a livelihood 
before the spirit of public service.  I quote from Dean Pound even though many 
will tell you the practice has changed.  We must still aspire for the public 
service ideal, even as we make a living. 
I would like to take a few moments to address the question of effective 
assistance of counsel in the larger sense, and whether we are living up to our 
oaths to serve the public without regard to “lucre or personal gain,” a common 
phrase found in most attorney oaths.  Before starting down that path, I would 
like to make a few preliminary comments to place the subject in perspective. 
Lest there be any doubt about it, we have a great profession.  The 
accomplishments of our brethren at the bar fill volumes.  Whether we focus on 
Sir Thomas More defending himself from false accusations of treason, Thomas 
Erskine defending Thomas Payne, Justice Jackson’s closing statement at the 
Nuremberg trials or Justice Marshall’s advocacy in Brown v. Board of 
Education,1 we are continually confronted with the great things done by great 
lawyers.  Likewise, while we do not hear about it, quality legal representation, 
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rendered by competent and committed lawyers, occurs each and every day and 
sustains our profession. 
As we drive the highways and byways of our cities, however, we are also 
confronted with the not-so-laudable parts of the profession.  In New Mexico, 
we see billboards with larger than life pictures of counsel stridently advertising 
“I Sue Drunk Drivers.”  As one good turn of shameless commerce deserves 
another, not far away defense counsel proudly hawks on another billboard “I 
Represent Drunk Drivers.”  In recent years we have seen a proliferation of 
such advertising—because we have a First Amendment right.  We also have 
seen a gradual decline in the camaraderie that was once the mark of the 
profession, brought about by “Rambo” litigation tactics that more and more 
attorneys are employing.  Winning is the end all and be all.  Or is it?  Or 
perhaps to rephrase, should it be?  Judge Miner of the Second Circuit notes, “A 
profession lacking collegiality is a profession lacking integrity.”2  These 
things, for starters, are troublesome—they bother me and they should bother 
you. 
I have spoken in the past regarding what I thought was the responsibility of 
judges—to be more than referees, to carefully consider the positions of 
counsel, but to do more than sanction when lawyer conduct is proven 
egregious.  Lawyers and judges have a responsibility beyond the short-term—
billable hours and deciding cases; that responsibility is to mentor or teach 
newer members of the Bar.  That responsibility is for the long-term good of the 
profession.  One wonders whether admonitions and pleas about this important 
responsibility have fallen on deaf ears, or perhaps they have fallen on ears just 
too busy to heed.  There are any number of valid excuses why this task is not 
being accomplished.  When you leave Saint Louis University School of Law, 
for the most part, you will be on your own, even if you join a large firm.  It 
wasn’t always that way and hopefully, it will not always be that way in the 
future. 
What does the public know about the law and lawyers?  For the most part 
the public’s only contact with our profession arises out of domestic relations 
cases and the criminal justice system.  And, like it or not, how people react to 
the profession and how we are perceived is dependent on peoples’ perceptions 
of the legal system as it functions on a day to day basis.  Is it a good 
impression or a bad impression?  Headlines from the New York Times and 
Chicago Tribune regarding persons unjustly condemned to death and on death 
row give one a feeling of discontent, a concern that something isn’t right. 
Periodically throughout my practice and more so since coming to the court 
of appeals, I have questioned whether we as a profession are rendering 
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effective assistance of counsel.  The answer to that question depends on how 
we define the term or the reason we attempt to define it. 
Many non-lawyers merely want to know if you can win the case.  Without 
getting technical, “effective assistance of counsel” is not how many cases you 
win. After all if you involve yourself in civil litigation which roughly fifty 
percent of the participants lose every day, the losing lawyer is not necessarily 
ineffective. 
Over eighty percent of criminal defendants are convicted so it obviously is 
not winning that defines effective assistance.  Likewise, on appeal less than 
twenty percent of cases are reversed.  Again, winning is not the criteria.  Given 
the variety of circumstances faced by a lawyer in his or her professional career, 
no universal definition of effective assistance of counsel exists.  Yet I would 
suggest that if each of us, whether we are retained or appointed, consciously 
attempts to give the client the best we have, after thorough investigation, 
research and preparation, we will have rendered effective assistance of 
counsel.  That is how I would define the term. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees most 
defendants the right to counsel, and the right to effective assistance of counsel.  
I am concerned, however, that the public, and the profession too, have begun to 
equate the Constitutional standard, whether the Constitutional right to counsel 
has been met or fulfilled, with whether counsel has done an adequate job 
representing the client.  The trouble with focusing solely on the Constitutional 
standard as a performance benchmark is that it was not meant to define what is 
acceptable professionally.  Yet, the sheer number of ineffective assistance 
claims resolved by courts may contribute to the public’s perception, if not the 
legal profession’s perception, of what is acceptable.  Conduct far below the 
norm is implicitly validated when it should be publicly rejected. 
In the case of Strickland v. Washington,3 Justice O’Connor laid out a two-
part test to determine whether the constitutional standard of effective counsel 
has been met: A) Whether counsel’s performance was deficient, meaning, 
whether the representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; 
and B) Whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant so as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial—or said another way, is there a reasonable 
probability that but for unprofessional errors the result would have been 
different?  Where a defendant has pleaded guilty, this means that the defendant 
would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted upon going to trial.  
Reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome of the proceeding. 
Thus, to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, a defendant must establish both that counsel’s performance was 
deficient and that it prejudiced him.  The Supreme Court has made it clear that 
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a court need not reach the issue of deficient performance if it finds no 
prejudice, and vice versa. 
In virtually every post-conviction proceeding, a defendant will allege 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Many of the claims are meritless, some are 
not.  It is unfortunate, but understandable, that pro se defendants routinely 
accuse counsel of being ineffective—they didn’t win.  It is troublesome that 
the accusation also frequently comes up when the defendant has post-
conviction counsel.  It is also troublesome that one practitioner may casually 
accuse another of what amounts to legal malpractice.  In some of these cases, 
the defendant’s trial or appellate counsel will furnish an affidavit essentially 
admitting the allegations, and equally disconcerting is the fact that the 
allegations, if true, reflect lawyering totally devoid of that high sense of public 
service described by Dean Pound.  By this I mean completely inadequate 
investigation, failure to subpoena necessary witnesses (be they expert or lay 
witnesses), failure to put on any evidence in the penalty phase of capital cases, 
failure to make either an opening statement or a closing argument, or totally 
erroneous advice concerning parole eligibility when a defendant is about to 
plead, and the like. 
We all recognize that in the real world of jury trials and uncertain proof, a 
trial carries risks.  It is not possible for a lawyer to experiment with different 
strategies if one goes awry.  Jurors’ reactions and judges’ rulings often are 
unpredictable, and there are many different ways to competently represent a 
client.  It is easy to find fault with counsel’s strategies after the fact.  Still, there 
is a class of errors that turn up that has very little to do with strategy and 
suggests totally inadequate preparation or a complete lack of awareness of the 
applicable rules. 
From the standpoint of the public welfare, you quickly realize that where 
the defendant’s guilt is supported by overwhelming evidence, such as three 
eyewitnesses, a DNA match or a confession, the conviction must be upheld 
regardless of counsel’s shortcomings.  In the rubric of Strickland, the 
defendant cannot establish prejudice—a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s omissions, the outcome would have been different.  Thus, the Sixth 
Amendment claim fails. 
Likewise, it is difficult to establish deficient performance under the Sixth 
Amendment because a defendant must overcome a strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct was within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance, and that counsel’s decisions were strategic or tactical.  Only in a 
very narrow class of cases—for example where counsel was laboring under a 
conflict of interest or the defendant effectively was unrepresented by counsel - 
will prejudice be presumed.  The Supreme Court was reluctant to adopt any set 
standard of performance so as not to restrict counsel’s independence and 
tactical choices, and because the Sixth Amendment’s effective assistance 
guarantee was “not to improve the quality of legal representation, although that 
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is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system . . . [but] simply to 
ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.”4 
While the Sixth Amendment may not have been designed to improve the 
quality of legal representation, neither should it serve to lessen the quality of 
that representation.  Given the volume of ineffectiveness claims, my concern is 
that we not become desensitized to less than competent representation.  The 
low standard for effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment 
should not be mistaken for competent representation.  I would suggest, where 
the record is clear, courts should point out deficient performance of the nature I 
have described and not merely reject the ineffectiveness claim as without 
merit, saying that counsel was “not ineffective” or “defendant has failed to 
show he had ineffective assistance.” 
Opinion after opinion resolves the issue in this abbreviated fashion, 
however, despite serious issues of professional competence.  I would suggest 
each time this occurs a new benchmark, lower than the one before, implicitly 
comes into existence, and it is against this new benchmark that the conduct of 
the next practitioner will be measured.  Though we know that constitutional 
ineffectiveness is different than professional competence, it is naive to think 
that the former does not have an effect upon the latter.  And, who cares—the 
guilty guy is in jail.  I hope you care. 
We see in Illinois that thirteen persons on death row have been exonerated.  
The New York Times5 notes the defense lawyers failed to prepare any strategy, 
arguments were incoherent and that the lawyers failed to attend hearings and 
call witnesses.  To the extent that this is true, what is startling is that 
convictions and death sentences were all affirmed and no one said or did a 
thing about the lawyers involved.  College students working on a class project 
were able to find evidence that escaped the attention of defense lawyers and 
which could have possibly exonerated the defendant. 
In McFarland v. Texas,6 when complaints were registered about a capital 
defendant’s lead counsel sleeping, the trial court reportedly responded, “the 
Constitution guarantees you a right of counsel, but does not say the lawyer has 
to be awake.”  Defendant’s lead counsel was an attorney who had practiced 
forty-two years, who later testified, “I’m seventy-two years old.  I customarily 
take a short nap in the afternoon.”7 Over a dissent, the appellate majority held 
that, while it did not condone the napping, co-counsel adequately represented 
the defendant. Thus, defendant could not show prejudice.8  The appellate 
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majority also suggested that co-counsel’s allowing lead counsel to sleep may 
have been tactical to produce sympathy,9 a suggestion termed “utterly 
ridiculous” by the dissent.10  I should point out that some courts would 
presume prejudice under the Sixth Amendment where counsel sleeps through a 
substantial portion of the trial.11  But quite apart from the Sixth Amendment 
inquiry, one has to wonder what was done to the lawyer?  Obviously, merely 
not condoning such napping is not enough to insure that clients are represented 
competently and the profession has standards that mean something. 
In Haney v. State,12 defense counsel assisting lead defense counsel came to 
trial so intoxicated that the judge sent him to jail.  The next morning, the judge 
produced both the client and co-counsel from jail, the capital murder trial of 
the defendant proceeded, and a sentence of death was imposed.  Defendant 
claimed that co-counsel’s incarceration deprived her of access to counsel, 
thereby infringing her constitutional right to counsel (a different claim than 
ineffectiveness).  Yet, what of the lawyer?  The comment by the appellate 
court that “[a]ll parties agreed that subject counsel had been sober and had 
performed satisfactorily during the first three days of trial,” is not very 
reassuring. 
Out of California in 1989 is People v. Garrison.13  A lawyer was stopped 
on the way to court.  His blood alcohol level was so high (.27) he could not 
legally operate a motor vehicle.  He got a ride to the courthouse, and his client 
was convicted.  It was undisputed that the lawyer was an alcoholic and that he 
consumed large amounts of alcohol during the trial.  The appellate court 
declined to adopt a rule that impaired attorneys are per se incompetent and 
upheld certain guilt phase convictions, finding that counsel “did a fine job in 
this case,”14 echoing the sentiments of the trial judge.  The court’s observation 
that defense counsel “did a fine job” seems to beg the obvious question, but the 
reported case indicates that counsel died of alcoholism pending appeal. 
To be sure, these are extreme examples.  The vast majority of lawyers 
deliver competent and committed representation, often under difficult 
circumstances.  But we cannot ignore those who do not provide such 
representation.  The Model Rules of Professional Conduct’s Rule 1.1 provides 
that “[c]ompetent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”  It 
seems that trial judges and opposing counsel may be ignoring the fact that 
incompetence is unethical and judge and lawyer alike are equally culpable for 
 
 9. Id. at 505 n.20. 
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not taking steps to report the particular practitioner.  Under the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct15 and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,16 the judge 
and the lawyer have a duty to inform the appropriate professional disciplinary 
authority when either knows that a practitioner is not fit to practice.  All of us 
must be cognizant of our professional duty to assist in and improve the legal 
system. 
Appellate judges, too, generally ignore violations of ethical norms.  
Perhaps they are too busy, have too many cases or too much time has passed 
between the trial and the appeal; however, when lawyers as well as judges 
ignore what is in plain view they become responsible for the problems about 
which we often hear them complain.  Appellate judges, trial judges, opposing 
counsel and co-counsel all have a positive obligation to monitor, encourage 
and enforce adherence to the rules of professional conduct.  This means doing 
something about impaired attorneys, those who are no longer fit to practice or 
a new practitioner who is simply in over his or her head and cannot deliver 
adequate representation. 
I recently referred an attorney to the disciplinary board for the state in 
which he practiced even though five years had elapsed from the trial to federal 
post-conviction proceedings.  Will it do any good?  It will get the attention of 
the Bar and, I hope, my colleagues.  Would a paying client get the same 
service?  Perhaps.  An old New Yorker cartoon that I came across depicts a 
lawyer talking to his client: “You have a pretty good case; How much justice 
can you afford?”17  Sad, but possibly true. 
I would suggest that in the private sector the problem, while still 
troublesome, is somewhat self-correcting because the offender will be sued for 
malpractice, a disciplinary complaint will be filed or the lawyer will go out of 
business if bad enough.  In the public or court-appointed sector, I have read 
that the ABA has suggested that inadequacy of compensation is one of the 
primary reasons for the problems being experienced.  Defense counsel should 
be adequately compensated just as public defender caseloads must be 
reasonable, but I think that the compensation issue is too convenient an excuse.  
While an underfunded defense can be a problem, an incompetent lawyer is 
worse, and I don’t believe money would make that lawyer more competent. 
We know that the caliber of person entering and graduating from law 
school should be higher than ever before because of higher LSAT scores, 
better undergraduate preparation, and even markedly higher GPAs (though this 
last factor may suggest grade inflation).  We know the scholarship of the 
faculties in our law schools is better today than in the past. 
 
 15. Canon 3(D)(2). 
 16. Rule 8.3(a). 
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Has the quest for billable hours deprived the newer lawyer of the training 
that thirty or thirty-five years ago was routinely expected by the newer lawyer, 
as well as the experienced practitioner?  Have law schools, in order to improve 
retention rates, granted social promotions?  Have bar exams been watered 
down such that a certain percentage of those passing simply will never be fit to 
practice law?  As suggested earlier, are judges condoning, implicitly or 
otherwise, less than competent representation in their courtrooms? 
The answer is probably a little bit of all of the above. 
The solution is not simple, and I have no idea how long it will take or if the 
problem can ever be totally solved; but I know that it must begin with each of 
us in this room.  It must begin with each of us reminding ourselves on a regular 
basis after we leave law school just how vitally important our profession is to 
the delivery of justice.  We must not forget that the adversarial system assumes 
that the truth can be served best only if each side is represented by a competent 
attorney.  Judges must not hesitate to get involved with lawyers appearing 
before them; professors must recognize the tremendous responsibility that they 
have assumed to insure that the next generation of attorneys recognize, in the 
words of Joseph Califano, that “lawyering at its finest is a noble profession.”18 
If you are embarking on a career in the law merely to make money or gain 
high office, think again and perhaps chose a different career.  As Dr. J. Phillip 
Wogaman, a clergyman non-lawyer, concluded recently at a seminar on the 
profession: “To be a lawyer is to be a servant of the community . . . by which 
the community itself can be judged.”19 
With recognition of the problem and the fact that we are the only solution, 
I will close my remarks by leaving with you the thought of an anonymous 
author that I have carried with me since beginning my practice of law: “A 
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